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French economist and philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy has drawn attention to the dominance 
of society by not only the powers of finance and commerce, but also by economic rationalism, 
a methodology of maximising profit, rent, utility, happiness, given suitable sets of incentives. 
Financial markets are largely irrational as they move from major booms into busts and instil a 
speculative mentality throughout society. Society itself is compared to a supermarket in which 
we choose from amongst a wide range of closely related alternatives, without having any clue 
of adverse consequences. This is a form of fatalism. Similarly, threats of major catastrophes 
are downplayed, including a nuclear conflagration, climate warming and moral collapses, 
especially individualism stimulated by desire as a key motivator of indefinite economic 
growth. The author’s proposal of enlightened catastrophism is discussed and an alternative 
is proposed in the form of enlightened subversion inspired by moves that would strengthen 
the ability of families and those responsible for managing businesses, education and health to 
exercise their own vocations in mutual service. 
Introduction
Jean-Pierre Dupuy (born 1941) is professor emeritus of the French École Polytechnique and 
professor at the University of Stanford. After a career spanning 30 years as an economist, he 
turned to philosophy. During the 1970s he collaborated with the philosopher, Ivan Illich 
(1926–2002), on issues of health. 
Dupuy’s (2012) view of the world has been influenced by the French philosopher, René Girard 
(born 1923), who is known for considering human culture as a realm of violence, marked by, 
amongst other things, envy, leading to mimesis, or attempts at rivalry. Given that Girard contrasts 
our violent human culture with the Kingdom of God, Dupuy’s analysis of the financial crisis 
which erupted in the United States of America (USA) and swept around the world in 2008 and 
the following years should deeply interest adherents of reformational philosophy. 
In the light of this philosophy’s emphasis on ‘sphere sovereignty’, or the differentiation of culture 
into distinct spheres subject to their own specific norms, but yet forming an interdependent society 
(known as ‘sphere universality’), Dupuy’s view that the State (politics) has become subservient 
to financial markets (legio), whilst the matters economic (i.e. the whole sphere of business, finance 
and money) have far too large a place in our lives, should have our immediate sympathy. 
Dupuy denounces the view that it is right for economics to have the upper hand because it stands 
for what is rational and efficient, whereas politics is full of irrational influences. By bowing to the 
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Dupuy se siening van ekonomisme. Die Franse ekonoom en filosoof Jean-Pierre Dupuy 
het die aandag gevestig op finansiële en handelsmagte se dominering van die samelewing. 
Hy het ook aangetoon hoe ekonomiese rasionalisme ’n dominerende rol in die samelewing 
speel, spesifiek deur die metodologie vir die maksimering van wins, nut, verhuring, geluk 
en die verskaffing van geskikte insentiewe. Finansiële markte is grootliks irrasioneel in hulle 
beweging van grootskaalse oplewings en plotselinge prysstygings tot bankrotskap en bevorder 
’n spekulatiewe mentaliteit regdeur die samelewing. Die samelewing self word vergelyk met 
’n supermark waarin ons ’n keuse maak uit ’n wye reeks van nou-verwante alternatiewe 
sonder om ’n idee te hê van wat die ongunstige gevolge inhou. Dit is ’n vorm van fatalisme. 
Die bedreiging wat grootskaalse katastrofes inhou word onderspeel. Sodanige katastrofes sluit 
in ’n atoom-ontbranding, klimaatsverandering en morele ineenstortings, veral individualisme 
wat gestimuleer word deur begeerte as ’n kernmotiveerder van oneindige ekonomiese groei. 
Die outeur se voorstel van verligte katastrofisme word bespreek en ’n alternatief in die vorm 
van ’n verligte omverwerping word voorgestel. So ’n alternatief is geïnspireer deur bewegings 
wat die vermoë van gesinne en diegene wie verantwoordelik is vir die bestuur van besighede, 
onderwys en gesondheid versterk om hulle eie roepings in gemeenskaplike diens uit te leef.
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demands of the economic without questioning them, we are 
turning it into a religion and this endangers our future – and, 
indeed, our politics – because we have no way of limiting 
its scope. This is what the author understands by econo-
mystification, but which I would prefer to call ‘economism’, 
because it involves an absolutisation of what is meant to be 
no more than a mode of being: the responsible stewardship 
of resources given to us, alongside many others that are 
equally important.
Overview of Dupuy’s essay
Dupuy (2012) has written a conceptual pamphlet to 
demonstrate how modern society has become subservient 
to economics and its rationality and, therefore, cannot be 
regulated from the outside any more. Economics rules by 
the ethics of ruthless competition. A summary of seven key 
points of the analysis is provided below.
The dominance of financial markets
Governments reacted in panic to the financial crisis which 
erupted in 2007 and 2008. Their leaders have made many 
compromises and unheard-of efforts to balance their budgets 
so as to pacify the markets. Journalists have referred to the 
crisis as a tsunami, a blind natural force. Yet it was a moral 
crisis. Sacrifices have been made to placate the markets at 
the expense of employment, the environment, education and 
other vital services. 
Sacrifices used to be made only to what was considered 
sacred. Over the past four centuries, the world has become 
disenchanted and desacralised. Commerce and economics 
have taken the place of the sacred as a remedy for being 
ruled by our passions. Friedrich A. von Hayek argued that 
incentives should play no role in economic life, because that 
would subject people to the arbitrary will of another human 
being. If the economic system were to work without human 
interference, it would provide an abstract, impersonal rule, 
similar to a law of nature, so that passions such as envy and 
resentment would cease to have any impact. 
Analyses of the financial crisis often make false distinctions 
– for instance, by contrasting the real economy, which 
produces goods and services, and the speculative economy. 
We speculate by buying what we do not need in the belief that 
somebody else will desire to have it and be prepared to pay a 
higher price for it at a future date. However, desires also play 
a strong role in the ‘real’ economy. Financial operators have 
been speculating on future rising values of food and rare raw 
materials, even by buying or constructing warehouses. 
By casting doubt on the ability of states to repay their debts, 
the financial markets have forced central banks to create 
massive amounts of liquidity to keep the financial markets 
operating. Such panic reactions indicate that the economic or 
financial system is unable to limit or regulate itself.
This is also borne out by the enormous swings in the financial 
markets from booms to busts. During the 1990s a speculative 
boom developed around the Internet (dot.com). It collapsed 
not long after the turn of the century. When speculators 
turned from shares to real estate (based on sub-prime 
mortgages issued in the USA), another major boom occurred. 
Its collapse is the cause of the current crisis.
When a boom is in full swing, the participants believe that 
it will go on forever. Benoit B. Mandelbrot (1924–2010), a 
complexity theorist, illustrates this with the story of the 
captain of a ship that is sailing across a lake in thick fog and 
who does not know where the opposite bank is. The longer 
he sails, the more he thinks that the water is very wide and 
that the bank will be a long way off yet. But he may hit that 
bank sooner than he thinks!
Nobody believes that globalisation, and capitalism as its 
core element, will come to an end: it will end, it is thought, 
only as a result of a major catastrophe. Yet, we are moving 
between the destruction of nature caused by the operation 
of our technical–economic system, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, extreme human violence, especially in the form of 
a general nuclear conflict. Financial investors put this reality 
far out of their minds.
 
The excessive place of economics in life today
By so closing their eyes to the destructive tendencies of the 
technical–economic system, the financial investors prove 
to be followers of ‘homo economicus’. As long as expected 
profits appear to exceed costs, all expressed in monetary 
terms, investments should proceed. Such calculations are 
now made by most modern citizens, as documented by 
Schirrmacher (2013). Everything is for sale, even politicians 
(through funding of their election campaigns in exchange for 
promises). The only norm that counts nowadays is efficiency, 
which works by a rational or economic calculation of costs 
and benefits. As soon as costs exceed benefits, one should 
terminate a service, a car or even the life of a human being. 
Dupuy (2012) refers to the ‘statistical fact’ that we incur most 
of the costs of medical care during the last year of our life. By 
that time the monetary benefits we contribute to society will 
have declined to almost zero. Utilitarians are inclined to use 
this statistic to question why we spend such large amounts of 
money on the last year of life when it could have been spent 
on our younger years. 
Take the scenario where a certain sum of money could be 
spent on (1) cancer research and/or (2) the elimination of 
black spots on roads. Here one maximises the number of 
lives saved by comparing marginal revenues and marginal 
costs for each activity. If the number of lives saved could 
be increased by switching money from road improvements 
to cancer research or vice versa, one finds the point where 
such switches would not save any more lives. At this optimal 
point the value of a human life is determined. When costs 
exceed this value, no more effort to save lives should be 
expended. Similarly, one can calculate the maximum number 
of patients who can be treated cost-effectively. By means of 
Page 2 of 7
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v78i1.2110http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 3 of 7
such calculations the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change ([IPCC] international panel of scientists who study 
climate change for the United Nations) has worked out 
that a life lost because of climate change in Mexico is much 
more valuable than one lost in Bangladesh. In other words, a 
human being is valued only as a sum of money. 
Violence
When economics, with its maximisation of ‘utility’, becomes 
the dominating religion of our time, it ceases to be able to 
limit itself. No limits are imposed upon it from the outside. 
Government cannot do this because it has become part of the 
economic system. This implies that all barriers to violence 
have been removed; climate warming cannot be stopped; as 
nuclear weapons are being miniaturised, they become like 
‘normal’ weapons and this may lead to a general nuclear 
conflict. In the light of real and potential disasters, the 
protection of nuclear power stations may not be as strong as 
required, as was shown by Fukushima in 2011. 
The only regulation that applies to economics is a form of 
self-transcendence. Under conditions of perfect competition, 
individual firms and consumers take prices as a given. Yet, 
through their buying and selling, they collectively set prices. 
In contrast, since no monetary values are set for restoring the 
natural environment or the climate, such regulation is unable 
to prevent pollution, climate warming and armed conflicts 
over scarce resources. 
Dupuy (2012) relates an enlightening fable. An inventor visits 
the president of a large country that is suffering a severe 
business downturn and tells him that he has an invention that 
would accelerate growth and return the country to its former 
prosperity. However, there is a price to pay: he should accept 
an annual death toll of 20 000 people. The president shudders 
and decides not to proceed. He has just rejected the invention 
of the motor car. In actual fact, worldwide, 1.2 million people 
are killed every year in car accidents, according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO). 
The general issue raised here is this: How many innocent 
victims are we prepared to sacrifice on the altar of the 
common good? The moral issue of deaths on the roads is 
easily turned into a natural phenomenon by saying that 
the deaths result from car traffic flows which are subject to 
hydro-dynamic laws and statistical regularities.
Time and prophecy
Why is it that we so easily accept such large numbers of 
fatalities? Is it possible to say that our failure in this regard 
results from a lack of faith in the future? This would be the 
more surprising, given that the economic system presupposes 
that there will be a future and that people will honour the 
promises they make. One makes and sells something only if 
one believes that the buyer will pay for it. Capital investment 
in new technologies or new products assumes that once 
they are ready, they will have a market. Indeed, the (silent) 
assumption is that we have an indefinite future. Were we to 
know, for instance, that the future will end in 20 or 30 years’ 
time, no long-term capital investment would take place. All 
structures with a long-term value would become worthless. 
This would effectively also reduce the values of shorter-term 
assets. As a result, the whole economic system would seize. 
The current financial crisis is based on doubts as to whether 
creditor states will repay the loans they have contracted 
themselves into or underwritten. As a result, such states find 
it very difficult to keep borrowing, if only to refinance their 
borrowings. Consequently, interest rates rise and add to 
everyone’s debt burdens. 
Given the crucial nature of the future, forecasts are important. 
Some forecasters have such a high reputation that people act 
on their views, with the result that the forecast future tends 
to be realised (self-fulfilling prophecies). 
Economic rationalism and the future
Since the outcome of our investing and financing lies in 
the future, the theory of rational choice says not only that 
‘rational people respond to incentives’ but also that ‘they 
will also consider the future consequences of present choices’ 
(Harford 2008:9). Dupuy (2012) casts doubt on this last 
statement. In supermarkets we may choose one brand of 
washing powder from 30 available; but would we consider 
any future consequences of the choices we make there?  
Max Weber ([1930] 1992) held that the belief of the Puritan 
Calvinists in predestination, as well as the Lutheran emphasis 
on our God-given calling to work, explains their work ethic 
and the spirit of capitalism. Up to this day, key capitalist 
centres tend to be Protestant rather than Catholic. 
Especially with reference to Puritans such as Baxter in New 
England (in the 17th century), Weber believed that Calvinists 
sought a guarantee for their election to eternal life by working 
hard in their earthly callings. If they experienced success, 
then this indicated a blessing from God and a sign that he 
had truly elected them. 
From the standpoint of economic rationalism, this is very 
strange, because they should have chosen a dominant 
strategy or ‘sure thing principle’ of doing little, given that 
their eternal destiny was beyond their control. Clearly, the 
Calvinists rejected such a dominant strategy, although they 
might have admitted that they could have opted for it. 
Dupuy (2012) believes that this strange way of believing 
simultaneously in predestination and in free will may be 
similar to existentialism. He quotes Jean-Paul Sartre: ‘I 
believe that my friend Pierre is friendly to me i.e. I decide 
to believe it and I conduct myself as if I were certain about 
it.’ In rational choice theory such a position is known as 
evidentialist. It is a story we tell ourselves, a fiction. We can 
also apply this to Weber’s ([1930] 1992) thesis: the Calvinists 
know that they have been predestined and that by refusing 
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the choice of fatalism and choosing to work assiduously, 
with such works being the effect of their predestination, they 
‘choose’ their predestination counter-factually. From this 
point of view the actual choice of the Calvinists springs from 
a ‘logic’ that is different from, perhaps even superior to, that 
of rational choice theory. 
In this regard, Dupuy (2012) refers to a paradox suggested 
by William Newcomb. Suppose there are two boxes. One is 
closed and one is transparent. The latter contains R10 000; 
the other may contain R1 million, if and only if a predictor 
foresees that the person will choose this box only. So, one 
may choose the closed box or both boxes. Rational people are 
inclined to take the two boxes and end up with ten thousand 
rand. This is also the choice of fatalists. Those who do not 
follow this logic and take only the closed box end up with 
R1m. 
Calvinists are like those who take the closed box only. They 
work very hard because they want to convince themselves 
that they are elected forever.
Dupuy (2012) sees a similarity in the story of his daughter, 
who travelled from Rio de Janeiro to Paris one day before a 
plane crashed on the same route at the same time. He told 
his daughter that if she had left a day later, she would have 
been killed. ‘But papa,’ she said, ‘if I had booked that flight, 
it would not have crashed.’ He characterises such a belief 
as follows: the future determines the past counter-factually, 
although the past determines the future causally. This may 
involve either ‘bad faith’ or ‘good faith’. 
Competing individuals
Our author illustrates ‘bad faith’ on the basis of Camus’s 
(1942) novel The outsider. The protagonist, Meursault, tends 
to look at himself, his relationships and the world at large, 
as it were, from the outside. He kills an Arab involuntarily. 
At the end of the story, when he is facing execution, he 
makes a confession to a priest. As a sulk he believes that 
he wants to be alone and that it is society that is envious of 
him as somebody who is different and it is society which, 
therefore, persecutes him. Compared to the ‘self-election’ of 
the Calvinist, Meursault self-excludes himself. Moreover, he 
needs others (god for him) so that they might know that he 
does not need them. Dupuy calls this a feature of modern 
individualism. As such, individualism is a lie, but a collective 
lie to itself. It requires a strange and negative co-operation 
with others. We need others to compete with, to surpass, if 
not to eliminate.
This is similar to the dialogue in Adam Smith’s ‘Theory of 
moral sentiments’ between the man within the breast, who 
is subject to passions and desires, and the rational impartial 
spectator. All desires converge on material wealth, because 
it attracts the admiring regards of others. Compared to the 
immutability of God, the value of what others think is very 
fickle. It is this desire for admiration (self-conceit) that is the 
basis of our desire for indefinite economic growth. 
Dupuy’s (2012) preference is for ‘good faith’ in the form of the 
time of a project. Before I acted, I could have done something 
different; but once I have acted, it will always be true that I 
could not have acted differently. This metaphysics is shared 
by most of the world’s rural populations. One should always 
act in such a way that the action would be causally possible 
if foreseen by an omniscient predictor. One should therefore 
not make promises that cannot be kept. 
No to fatalism
However, in contrast to such ‘good faith’, ‘bad faith’, or the 
fatalism of economic rationalists, prevails today. Fatalists 
adopt a dominant strategy, that is, taking the two boxes in 
Newcomb’s problem and finding the closed one empty or 
leading a life of idleness as we cannot change our eternal 
destiny. A society which believes that it is led by rationalism 
does not believe that the future can be forecast, because it 
is formed by human will. This is exactly the fatalism of 
the dominant strategy rejected by Weber’s ([1930] 1992) 
Calvinists.
If we think of our society as a supermarket, then we all have 
myriad ways in which we can go. We choose the best. So we 
believe. Since, as individualists, we do not trust anybody 
else, economic transactions are hardly possible (will a buyer 
pay his bill?). Ethics has to come into play as a deus ex machina 
[an unexpected power or event saving a hopeless situation], 
often in the form of state law, to prevent chaos and violence. 
General mistrust, as evidenced in the current financial crisis, 
closes the temporal horizon as people and organisations turn 
in on themselves. Economic rationalists are those who will 
find Newcomb’s closed box empty. 
Rejecting this approach, Dupuy (2012) opts for a version 
of project time which he dubs ‘enlightened catastrophism’, 
which is the (unknown) time that separates us from the 
occurrence of surmised tragedies. We should let ourselves 
be guided by the future we have projected. Although 
we possess all the information needed to surmise major 
moral, natural, industrial or technical catastrophes, those 
threatened by them refuse to believe that they are imminent. 
Their knowledge is not translated into faith. In contrast, 
enlightened catastrophism acts as if the worst will come to 
pass and then assumes that we are free to refuse that destiny. 
By positing the worst as a fatality sure to happen, all powers 
of intelligence, imagination and determination are called 
upon to prevent it.
Politics should have a prophetic content such that 
prophesied adverse futures will not occur. This is impossible 
when financial markets use politicians as their servants. By 
suffering this econo-mystification we allow financial markets 
to be the masters of our destiny. It means that they become a 
blob, a very dangerous animal ready to devour nations and 
individuals, without any malicious intent, of course. 
Strong points
Dupuy’s (2012) analysis sheds light on some important 
problems we are faced with today. Those who are of ‘green’ 
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persuasion and are alarmed by the on-going pollution and 
destruction of the world’s ecology as well as by the now 
certain warming of the climate as a result of greenhouse 
emissions have in fact been relegated to the function of an 
ecological conscience, or a deus ex machina that should put a 
stop to the destruction perpetrated by the current economic 
system. 
His concept of enlightened catastrophism would call on 
all members of society to accept that nuclear power and 
nuclear armed conflicts as well as climate change are likely 
to generate major disasters within the foreseeable future. 
The precondition for such acceptance is that politicians are 
prepared to break with their sycophancy towards financial 
markets. There are historical precedents which show that 
this is possible. In 1953, for instance, a conference was held in 
London to deal with the enormous financial problems facing 
West Germany (Tsipras 2013). Effective government action 
then forestalled the types of problem now faced by Greece 
and other highly indebted European states. 
Dupuy’s suggestion that the state should not be ruled 
by financial markets and capitalist corporations is very 
important indeed. In the United States it would be necessary 
for Congress to kick out the lobbyists and govern on the basis 
of public justice rather than being beholden to corporate 
financiers. Moreover, electorates should cease to connive 
with business influence in the realm of politics. 
Dupuy’s metaphor of modern society as a supermarket 
is very apt. It is a system in which individuals – all of us – 
compete for the best portions of material wealth, regardless 
of how such wealth is produced and what catastrophes 
might result from it. Our behaviour is indeed a form of 
fatalism, inasmuch as we keep doing things that we know 
have adverse consequences. 
In this regard, his analysis of economic rationality in 
conjunction with neo-classical economics as it is applied to 
areas such as medical care is worth noting. It shows in fact 
that the supermarket model applies also to hospitals and 
care for the dying as if there were no qualitative difference 
between medical care and the running of a fleet of jeeps by 
the army (an analogy used by Dupuy).
Despite the lack of faith in the future (given the fatalism 
of economic rationality in the competitive model of the 
supermarket) our society, not to mention the politicians, 
becomes upset when there is either little economic growth or 
no growth at all. Unless our material prosperity keeps growing 
indefinitely, we believe that we are somehow in trouble. In 
this respect, Dupuy makes a point that is rarely made: capital 
investment takes time and if, for whatever reason, there 
were to be a final point in time, all such investment would be 
worthless and also all current assets would lose their value. 
In this light, the insistence of financial markets that states 
should repay their debts and that any doubt about this leads 
to major problems becomes understandable.  
Weaknesses
It is difficult to see how Dupuy (2012) would tackle the 
dominance of financial markets over politics and politicians. 
Would these markets, including their speculative activities 
run by means of supercomputers, be willing to play their 
part in tackling major threats as identified under enlightened 
catastrophism? No, along with other powerful interest 
groups, the financial markets would do their very best to 
downplay the severity of acute disasters. 
So, how should the financial markets be constrained to play 
a servant role in society rather than that of a demanding 
taskmaster?
One of the problems is that each of the disasters referred to 
by Dupuy involves a long process over time, and that each 
produces incidents, events out of the ordinary, which may 
or may not foreshadow major calamities. Dupuy’s response 
would be the story told by Mandelbrot above to the effect 
that if we have not yet experienced the potential calamity 
such as a financial collapse or a nuclear conflagration, we 
might still be very close to it. 
Moral disasters
Economism, driven by self-interests, blinds people to moral 
issues. In the USA, there has been a series of mass shootings 
which has caused the second Obama administration to work 
towards gun control. Barack Obama, however, has yet to 
persuade a majority of USA citizens of the need for such 
control. Similarly, the intertwinement of corporate business 
and government is well known – documented, as it has been, 
by Hauter (2012). But such unhealthy intertwinement fails to 
arouse the indignation of the electorate. 
The growing inequality between rich and poor, exacerbated 
by financial speculation, is another moral consequence of 
economism. 
Climate warming
Discussions on climate warming focus on issues such as: by 
how much will sea levels and average world temperatures 
rise by 2100 and by when will the warming trend be 
irreversible? Meanwhile, weather events which are much 
more violent or frequent than in the past serve as warning 
signals, but without triggering determined attempts to 
reduce the volumes of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide in the atmosphere. Activists have suggested that the 
world should attempt to reduce carbon dioxide from the 
present 390 ppm (and rising) to no more than 350 ppm if the 
worst of climate warming is to be avoided. James Hansen, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
climate scientist, together with other scientists, wrote in 2008:
If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which 
civilization developed, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing 
climate change suggest CO2 will need to be reduced from its 
current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm. If the present overshoot 
of this target of CO2 is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding 
irreversible catastrophic effects. (Weir 2009:32)
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Nuclear disasters 
Recent nuclear disasters, such as the explosions at Chernobyl 
in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011, were part of a series of 
accidents and near misses since the first nuclear bombs were 
exploded in August 1945. Dupuy (2012) rightly calls attention 
to the dangers of nuclear weapons losing their special status 
as a result of miniaturisation. However, decisions taken after 
the Fukushima disaster to cancel or delay the construction 
of new nuclear power stations are already being questioned. 
Technicism ignored
The main reason why Dupuy’s (2012) proposal of enlightened 
catastrophism is unlikely to stand a great chance of success 
is that he has ignored the fundamental motive of our culture 
to control the future by means of scientific technology or 
technicism. Schuurman ([1972] 1980:252–254) analysed 
approaches to the future of positivist thinkers who would 
seek to control it by means of science and technology, 
including planning and cybernetics, and by those critical of 
modern technology (transcendentalists) who would bet on 
creative disorder or permanent revolution. Schuurman’s 
([1972] 1980) own view of futurology is based on an analogy 
from technological development, especially its two traits 
of continuity and discontinuity. By drawing this analogy, 
he demonstrates that technical development is always 
both continuous, based on what is already known and 
available, and discontinuous: ‘Invention, as the expression 
of human freedom, creativity and ingenuity, prevents such 
petrification’ (Schuurman [1972] 1980:252). In addition, 
smaller changes are made regularly. Without recognising 
this combination, we are in danger of absolutising either 
technological–scientific control of the future or freedom and 
the new. The chaos brought about by freedom would call 
forth technical or scientific control, and extreme order would 
issue in a call for freedom. 
Dupuy sees disasters looming that have their origin in 
the positivist attempt to create a better future by means of 
scientific technology. His own enlightened catastrophism 
runs the danger that it would be applied from a technicistic 
perspective. One might opt for geo-engineering, for example, 
to reduce the volume of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
but run the danger of unexpected adverse consequences.  
If enlightened catastrophism were accompanied by a general 
repentance of the ways of technicism and economism, it 
might well work through major changes in the ‘supermarket’, 
because motor cars and aeroplanes would be used only as 
a last resort, ships equipped with sails, biofuels phased out 
and the land so freed restored by biological methods. 
This is, of course, easier said than done. A general repentance 
or renewal movement involves a deep conversion, which is 
wrought ultimately by the Holy Spirit working through the 
Word of God.
The road ahead
A world dominated by technology and finance is unable to 
ban violence. On the contrary, it increases it. This appears 
to fit in with René Girard’s views. In March 2005, he said 
in an interview with Thomas Assheuer that Christianity is 
the only religion that has broken with anarchic religions in 
which the sacrifice or scapegoat is always guilty. Because 
Christ died as the innocent Lamb of God, taking away all our 
sins, we are unable to kill innocent ‘sacrifices’. The West has 
colonised and exploited Islamic countries on the basis of its 
technical superiority. In this respect, the war in Algeria was a 
prophetic situation: we are now confronted with the sudden 
arrival of a violent Islamic movement on the world stage. 
Girard compares this with the Soviet Union, which turned 
politics into religion, but hopes that this is a corruption of 
Islam rather than its essence. When Christianity refers to 
things eschatological, then it does not talk so much about God 
destroying this world but rather about people destroying 
the world themselves. Christianity is a non-violent religion 
inasmuch as it localises violence in ourselves. It does away 
with the guilty scapegoat of primitive religions (Assheuer 
2005:49). 
One would therefore expect Christians to be in the vanguard 
of peace movements, including the movement for nuclear 
disarmament, and against police brutality, the destruction of 
the world’s ecology and climate warming.
The dominance of finance over the State and the rest of 
society is strongly at variance with the so-called principle of 
sphere sovereignty, a view which says that there are spheres 
in society that are intrinsically different from one another, 
each subject to God’s sovereignty and called as such to serve 
one another, but not for one or more to supplant the others. 
Abraham Kuyper called on this principle to defend the 
establishment of a free Christian university in 1880, that is 
to say, free from State governance but called to serve society 
in its own specific scholarly way. As he expounded this 
principle, Kuyper emphasised the crucial task the State has to 
be on the lookout for those who would try to rule over other 
institutions for their own benefit and that it nip in the bud 
all attempts of other spheres to lord it over others (Kuyper 
[1880] 1956:51). 
In this way of thinking, the State should call the sphere 
of finance and economics to order and take measures to 
ensure that they serve rather than dominate others. The 
problem Dupuy (2012) is wrestling with is that the State 
has become subservient to financial or economic powers 
and, consequently, is unable to do its job properly. This 
implies that it is effectively powerless to contain the violence 
involved in the powers’ increasing dominance over society. 
Financial speculation based on foodstuffs may trigger food 
riots in various countries, as it did in 2008. Since business 
corporations rely on the power of scientific technology 
to outwit competitors and seduce customers into buying 
whatever they produce, no matter what the effects are on 
the environment and employment, there is no chance that 
we will be able to constrain the trajectory of economic life to 
a truly sustainable one which will allow current and future 
generations to live in true peace and freedom. 
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When education and medical care must adhere to competitive 
business models, using economic tools such as operations 
research and rational choice, their provision becomes 
dominated by the need to maintain a balance of income 
and expenditure. This cannot be good for such vital public 
services.
The problems posed by a globalised system of financial 
dominance have deep historical roots. The economic system, 
shaped by Western technology, has always sought to extend 
itself by colonisation. Many non-Western cultures have been 
affected by this or split between westernising elites and those 
adhering to their now marginalised religion and culture. The 
current trend towards an increasing gap between rich and 
poor, both within Western countries and between Western 
countries and the many so-called developing countries, has 
increased violence. 
Enlightened subversion
If we cannot rely on the State to liberate us from the oppressive 
rule of financial markets, and if for the same reason Dupuy’s 
(2012) proposal of enlightened catastrophism offers little 
chance of success, what, then, can be done?
Dupuy’s emphasis on time should assist us. If we were 
to change our very short-term focus to much longer-
term thinking, pressures would abate. His analysis of the 
interrelationship between travel and work might point 
the way. Many people experience frustration in driving to 
work by car as a result of traffic jams or by being tortured 
at work by monotony and stress. Many others are frustrated 
as a consequence of becoming and being unemployed. Some 
manage to find compensation in leisure activities. But would 
it not be possible to create a different lifestyle by enhancing 
the world beyond the sphere of jobs? Recent initiatives 
– such as transitional towns, permaculture, developing 
communal gardens, collecting chickens from battery poultry 
farms that otherwise would be destroyed as being too old 
and having them around family homes, tending beehives 
and vegetable gardens on top of office buildings – could 
be extended and organised as part of new, sustainably 
organised communities. They all have a longer-term focus 
than conventional approaches. Unemployed people could be 
taught how to set up gardens and grow quality vegetables 
on plots of urban land without using chemical fertilisers and 
pesticides, and the produce could be sold to schools as an 
input to school lunches or supplied to hospital kitchens, soup 
kitchens and food banks. Skilled tutors would be provided 
by social welfare organisations, city governments, and so 
forth. Gradually, new communities would develop and start 
to displace modern supermarkets and their suppliers. 
Essential to success along these lines is that we reinstate 
the importance of the commons, areas that are publicly 
owned and managed. A feature of modernity is that private 
property has expanded to such an extent that the commons 
have virtually disappeared, or are about to be privatised. Yet, 
well-run commons are an important means of strengthening 
sphere sovereignty, as they provide families, schools and 
churches with scope for interaction and development that 
is not available within the private spheres of business and 
finance. 
Since the financially powerful would strongly resist bringing 
the commons back (land, clean rivers, health, local currencies, 
railways, roads, raw materials, the radio spectrum, etc.), 
such a development should be adopted and advocated by 
politicians. 
Conclusion
Dupuy’s (2012) book should stimulate all who adhere to 
a reformational view of the world to ponder how far our 
modern society has moved way from what Kuyper ([1880] 
1956) called ‘sphere sovereignty’. It should also cause them 
to consider how this move might be subverted peacefully, 
for example by raising people’s awareness of desire as a key 
motivator of economic growth, by fostering the development 
of new commons and by encouraging long-term rather than 
short-term thinking. Should these come to pass, it would 
amount to an enlightened subversion of the current economic 
or financial power structures. 
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